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Organising collective action for effective environmental 
management and social learning in Wales 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Purpose:  The paper explored key factors that might lead to successful agri-
environmental social learning and collective action in order to deliver landscape-scale 
resource management within agri-environment schemes   
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper used the theory of collective action as an 
analytical framework to examine findings from in-depth interviews with 20 members of 
two co-operative initiatives in Wales and 2 participatory workshops.  Consideration of the 
theory helped in understanding how individuals come together to provide public goods, 
and the conditions that make this activity a success 
 
Findings: Factors of importance for organising and delivering collective agri-environment 
schemes were: locally adaptable engagement strategies; working with group members 
previously known to each other; institutional arrangements that limited group size and 
which allowed groups to develop their own solutions and implementation rules; and 
external support offering the services of a local facilitator and funding for both planning 
and management stages.  A clear finding from the research was the extent to which both 
business and social confidence can grow within such groups which opens up further 
development opportunities.  
 
Practical Implications: The paper identifies key factors that could be used to encourage 
and enhance the success of co-operative groups in delivering landscape-scale agri-
environment schemes.   
 
Originality/Value:  The research findings identify appropriate mechanisms for the design 
and delivery of collective agri-environment schemes and environment management in the 
UK, which can also be applied to other parts of Europe. 
 
Keywords: agri-environment scheme; collective action; social learning; farmer co-
operatives; landscape-scale management. 
 
Word length: 6,575 
1. Introduction 
Agri-environment schemes (AES) are still one of the main policy mechanisms 
used in Europe to deliver environmental benefits on agricultural land.  These 
schemes have traditionally been delivered at the scale of the individual holding 
through agreements with the individual land manager.  Whilst they are reported to 
have delivered some benefits for biodiversity (Boatman et al., 2008)  there is 
increasing recognition of the greater potential that may come from managing land 
at larger scales than currently delivered through individual farm-level agreements.  
In particular, conservation experts believe that large-scale restoration and 
enhancement action is likely to be of far greater benefit to biodiversity than the 
current ‘piecemeal’ impact of single-farms.  A large-scale project can reduce 
habitat fragmentation and maintain ecological networks (Adams et al., 1994; 
Whittingham, 2007). Catchment-scale projects can deliver new flood storage 
capacity within river systems, which is of particular concern due to increased 
flood risk arising from climate change. Managing land at a landscape-scale also 
offers potential to help overcome problems of cumulative and spatially diffuse 
environmental degradation, such as the abatement of diffuse pollution and soil 
erosion.  This is reflected in the requirements of the EU Water Framework 
Directive to work at catchment level (European Union, 2000). 
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In the UK a number of mechanisms for achieving landscape-scale land 
environmental management through group or collective agri-environment 
schemes (see Franks and McGloin, 2007) or ‘collective contracts’, (see CRER 
and CJC Consulting, 2002; Hodge and Reader, 2007) have been proposed.  
These schemes are designed to operate through the collaboration of contiguous 
land managers, within a specified boundary.  Some such approaches are in the 
early stages of development in UK; for example, in England the Higher Level 
Stewardship Scheme has a supplement for group applications which offers a 
contribution towards the costs of facilitating communal agreements.  Wales is 
also considering the introduction of collective agri-environment schemes.  The 
Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) review of AES proposed the development 
of a targeted landscape or catchment scale option within schemes, with particular 
encouragement for collaborative actions to help tackle climate change issues, 
such as flood risk management (Welsh Assembly Government, 2008).  However, 
whilst the principle of these schemes is established, there remains uncertainty as 
to the most effective ways to design and deliver them.   
This paper uses the theory of collective action as an analytical framework to 
explore ways in which AES can encourage and enhance the success of co-
operative groups in delivering landscape-scale resource management.  
Consideration of the theory can help in understanding how individuals come 
together and through a process of social learning provide public goods as a 
group, and the conditions that make this activity a success.  This can then help to 
inform the appropriate design and delivery of collective agri-environment 
schemes.   
A common definition of collective action is “action taken by a group (either directly 
or on its behalf through an organisation) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared 
interests” (Scott and Marshall, 2009).  The theory of collective action was first 
discussed in 1965 (Olson, 1965) and the effectiveness of this approach was 
challenged by Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons”.  Hardin contended that 
due to the inherent selfishness of humans, rational self interest will always prevail 
over the interest of the common good.  He suggested that there will always be 
“free-riders” that cause collapse of the system.  However, in Ostrom’s seminal 
work (1990) she refutes common pool resources as a problematic issue.  
Drawing on a large number of examples throughout the world, Ostrom identifies 
situations where local people have come together in an agreement to restrain 
their consumption of a resource that is scarce.  Further research into collective 
action has shown that under certain circumstances, collective management can 
be a viable and more effective approach than a resort to individual property 
rights, or management by public agencies (see Ayer, 1997; Agrawal, 2001; 
Poteete and Ostrom, 2008).   
The analytical framework presented in this paper is based on Agrawal (2001) 
who cites a large number of conditions identified by Ostrom (1990), Wade (1994) 
and Baland and Platteau (1996) which are conducive to encouraging or 
facilitating collective action in the context of common-pool resources.  Whilst 
some of these are more appropriate to collective action of true ‘common property’ 
resources, others would be applicable to collective action situations in respect of 
individual landowners undertaking collective action on contiguous areas of land. 
The difference between these two situations is that, under the latter type of co-
operation, members may not have to restrain their consumption and use of the 
resources that they manage in common; they simply use them more efficiently, 
without necessarily using them any less (Trawick, 2006).   
An important element in facilitating collective action for environmental 
management is the process of social learning.  Blackmore et al (2007) state that 
“social learning is central to non-coercive natural resource governance“.  Reed et 
al (2010) provide a useful definition of social learning as a process that results in: 
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a) a change in understanding in the individuals involved, b) a change that goes 
beyond the individual and is situated within the wider social unit, and c) a process 
that occurs through social interactions and between actors within a social 
network. Through this process people learn about the character and 
trustworthiness of others and develop social capital and norms of interaction that 
can enhance their capacity for collective action. 
 
2. Methodology 
The paper is based on the empirical results of two research projects conducted 
between 2004 and 2008 which aimed to seek to identify the most appropriate 
ways to design and implement collective AES in Wales (Mills et al., 2006; Mills et 
al., 2008).  The research involved the analysis of 13 case studies using 
documentary sources, semi-structured interviews and participatory workshops, to 
seek to identify the most appropriate ways to design and implement collective 
AES in Wales.  The main focus of the interviews was to determine farm and 
farmer characteristics and their experience of co-operative working, the effect of 
co-operative working on the farm and the impact on group members’ lives. In 
addition, questions were asked about the members’ social networks in order to 
enable an assessment of the networks of the whole group, a network ‘map’ to be 
plotted and the role of individuals within this network.  In analytical terms this 
provided a means of understanding the dynamics of the co-operative, and the 
role of individuals within it. The research also involved participatory workshops to 
which group members were invited, to discuss the appropriate design and 
delivery of collective agri-environment schemes based on their experiences.  A 
SWOT analysis of each case study was undertaken to evaluate the Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats in respect of each group. The output 
from the case study interviews and workshops were analysed, and the benefits of 
co-operative working and key success factors were identified.  
 
2.1  Empirical Research – the case studies  
The project undertaken in 2008, which we will examine in particular depth here, 
looked at three case studies in detail, interviewing 28 farmers.  This paper 
focuses on two of these groups: the Pontbren Group; and a collective AES 
agreement on commonland known as Ireland Moor.  This section of the paper 
gives a brief pen-picture of these two cases, in order to contextualise the analysis 
and discussion in the subsequent sections.   A summary of group characteristics 
is provided in Table 1.   
Pontbren Group 
The Pontbren Group is comprised of 10 hill farmers based in Powys, mid Wales.  
The 10 members farm a contiguous block of around 1,000 hectares of land along 
the Pontbren river.  These hill livestock farms vary in their stocking densities and 
profitability. There is also a wide range in ages from 30 to 66 years of age.  With 
the exception of the leader, all members of the group were born on their farms 
and were known to each other from childhood; in fact many attended the same 
school and chapel.  Whilst the members had not co-operated formally before, 
they were known to each other through community and kinship ties.  Whilst 
motivations for joining the group differed, at the heart was the recognition that the 
farmers were caught on a ‘productivist’ treadmill, with high costs and high stock 
numbers, causing the hedges and woodlands on their farms to become 
degraded. By coming together as a group and through a process of social 
learning the group members developed the confidence to significantly alter their 
farming systems and to approach WAG for funding to de-stock their sheep by 
20% on average for the group which resulted in huge environmental benefits.  
The members began to recognise that by improving their environment, this would 
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also help production, by providing shelter for the sheep.  They were dissatisfied 
with the available AES for environmental work which were considered too 
autocratic and inflexible and often not relevant to their farming systems.  
Therefore, they sought alternative funding and successfully obtained various 
funds, including an Enfys grant, a lottery funded programme administered by 
Wales Council for Voluntary Action, for environmental work which allowed them 
to have control over the implementation of environmental management.  To date, 
the Pontbren group have planted 120,000 trees and 16.5 miles of hedgerows and 
established 12 ponds covering 2.2 hectares. Areas of wetland have been fenced 
off to ensure protection. The group has also established its own tree nursery 
where all trees and hedgerows are grown in group-produced compost from seeds 
gathered on the farms. In addition, offcuts and windfalls from trees and hedges 
are recycled into bedding for livestock or compost using a jointly purchased 
chipping machine part-funded by the Welsh Development Agency. 
Ireland Moor Group 
The Ireland Moor group is comprised of over 100 rightsholders on registered 
common land collectively called Ireland Moor, but covering the 2,500 hectares of 
Llandilow Grapan to Glascwm commons in Powys, Wales.  Of the 100 
rightsholders for the common, around 45 place sheep and a few cattle on Ireland 
Moor.  The group is comprised of a central committee of 10 people and is legally 
constituted.  Each committee member is responsible for communicating with 
group members in specific geographical areas of the common.  Initially, new 
owners bought the hill in 1989 and began to talk with the government agency, 
Countryside Council for Wales (CCW), about ways of managing the land more 
sensitively, claiming that the common was overgrazed.  The commoners’ 
committee was approached by CCW about the possibility of a collective agri-
environment agreement, which required collecting key information, including a 
live register of rightsholders, and gaining legal status for the association.  The 
coming together of the landowner, CCW and commoners enabled a process of 
social learning which resulted in a collective agreement that all were happy with.  
In total, 45 active graziers and around 55 commoners who are not currently 
exercising their rights signed the agreement, representing 92% of rights holders.   
The main benefit has been collective de-stocking of sheep which has reduced 
overgrazing pressure on the environment.  This has meant the introduction of 
carefully considered self-regulation.  Another benefit has been to improve the 
communication within the group and to rekindle the sense of community on the 
hill in order to facilitate its management.  There is a sense of a wider purpose that 
they are acting positively to enhance the hill; that the collective agreement is 
something bigger than just farming.   
 
Table 1 Summary of group characteristics 
 Pontbren Group Ireland Moor Group 
Group size 10 members 100 common rightsholders 
members, including 10 
committee members 
Farm size and type Farm sizes from 50 ha to 186 
ha. 8 hill cattle and sheep 
farms, 1 sheep only farm and 1 
dairy farm.   
Farms sizes from 12.5 ha to 
250 ha.  Majority are hill sheep 
and cattle farms. 
Household income 4 farms - household income 
solely from farm.  3 farms - 
spouse works off-farm.  2 
group members work full-time 
off-farm.   
2 committee members’ farms - 
household income solely from 
farm.   Remaining 8 farms - off-
farm sources of income.  
Institutional arrangements Limited company with a Formally constituted group with 
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constitution, all members are 
Directors and considered 
equal. 
a central committee of 10 
members representing 9 
members within 10 
geographical areas. 
AES activities Sheep de-stocking, hedge and 
tree planting, pond creation 
and restoration, stream bank 
protection. 
Livestock de-stocking, bracken 
control. 
Other group activities Joint purchase of wood 
chipper, wood chip composting 
and bedding, tree nursery, joint 
marketing of branded product.  
Dealing with recreational 
issues on the common. 
 
3. Analysis and discussion of findings  
The following analysis identifies factors from the case studies that can lead to 
collective action for environmental outcomes, and can help in informing the 
design and delivery of appropriate AES for environmental management at a 
landscape scale.   
 
3.1 Engaging farmers in social learning and collective action 
The research revealed that motivations for joining the groups for environmental 
management varied.  The case studies demonstrated that whilst economic 
motives were important there were also social, cultural and psychological factors 
that motivated farmers to join.  The different motivations for the groups are 
considered in turn.   
Access to funding: The case studies revealed various financial motives for 
farmers to join group schemes.  The Pontbren group, for example, recognised the 
need for financial support to undertake more sustainable farming practices and 
environmental improvements on their land.  Dissatisfied with the agri-environment 
schemes on offer, they saw that through the formation of a group they were more 
likely to obtain funding which would give them some autonomy over how these 
improvements were implemented. The group activities are collaborative in that 
the group exercises a high degree of autonomy over their activities incorporating 
a strong group vision and identity. The Ireland Moor group realised that through a 
collective AES they could gain financial help in dealing with overgrazing issues 
and declining levels of co-operation and governance on the common.  As their 
management activities are prescribed by a Government-funded AES they are 
more co-operative rather than collaborative in nature. 
Opportunities for learning: Some of the group members saw collective working as 
an opportunity for learning and exchanging knowledge and information to 
improve their businesses.  Whilst the Pontbren members previously assisted 
each other only with simple farm tasks, such as moving livestock, peer support 
since joining the group now operates at a much more detailed farm decision-
making level, where members are offering one another advice about regulation 
requirements or the prices paid for inputs.   
This mutually supportive culture provided by group membership is highly valued 
by individuals as expressed in the following quotes. 
 
“I think the social comfort of being in the group, you can’t value it.  You’ve got 
somebody to talk to.  I think it gives you more confidence to try things” (Pontbren 
member).  
 
“I would now have a word and ask “where are you buying your feed from this year, 
where are you buying your fertiliser, what price are you paying, do you suggest I go 
there” something I wouldn’t have asked before” (Pontbren member). 
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The social interaction and learning within groups has led to individual changes in 
their understanding about the sustainable management of their land.  In the 
Pontbren case it resulted in a critical look at the underlying assumptions on which 
their farm structures were based leading to widespread de-stocking, an option 
that most had not previously considered.  The group members also sat down 
together with individual maps of their farms and marked on areas for 
environmental improvement on their land.  This process resulted in a greater 
allocation of land for environmental management than was originally anticipated 
reportedly due to a feeling of collective efficacy, that by collectively changing 
practices on a contiguous area they were having a much greater positive impact 
on the environment. The feeling of collective efficacy was also a driving force for 
the Ireland Moor commoners who recognised that they were collectively 
contributing to the environmental improvements on the hill.   
“When you go out on the hill and you realise that you play a part in its 
management, seeing all the wildlife and birds.  All this is good”. (Ireland Moor 
member). 
Sharing and mobilising resources:  Another motive for farmers working 
collectively was to share and mobilise resources.  By entering collective agri-
environment schemes farmers are also gaining economies of scale and scope by 
pooling and exchanging their own resources.  For example, the Pontbren group 
benefits from having a machinery pool where a wood chipper, silage kit, and tools 
are shared.  Labour can also be shared in the implementation of new fencing and 
tree planting activities.  
Development of diversification activities:  In joining a group some members also 
recognised the potential to undertake other diversification activities that go 
beyond achieving environmental outcomes, such as the development of joint 
marketing products.  A benefit also identified by Renting and Van De Ploeg 
(2001) when examining Environmental Co-operatives in the Netherlands. The 
Pontbren members, on forming a group, found they could access funding that 
would not have been available to them as individuals, such a funds to purchase a 
wood chipping machine which is used to produce compost and livestock bedding. 
This prospect of additional funding at a later stage offers an additional incentive 
for farmers to become involved. 
Lobbying power:  A farmers’ co-operative has the potential to give a joint voice, 
greater than that of the individual. Increased credibility and legitimacy is often 
associated with groups and may be another reason for farmers joining.  As the 
Pontbren group has shown, if a group can demonstrate that it works effectively, it 
may also be able to obtain further funding which would not be available to 
individuals.   
“As a group you can probably attract more funding.  Everyone seems to listen to a 
group.  If you’ve got 10 of you around the table instead of one you are more likely 
to get noticed.  I think definitely you’ve got more clout in a group”. (Pontbren 
member) 
 
3.2 Group characteristics 
Once part of a group it appears from the case material that there are certain 
group characteristics that are important for increasing the success of social 
learning within the groups and facilitating collective activity (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 
1994; Baland and Platteau, 1996).  These include shared norms and aims; 
homogeneity of ideas and interests; presence of social capital; and appropriate 
leadership. 
Shared norms/aims: Whilst group members may have different perspectives and 
undertake different farming practices, ultimately the success of co-operative 
working is based on shared norms and aims.  For example, the Ireland Moor 
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group shared a strong sense of valuing the traditional management of the hill and 
wanting to revert the area back to a time in their memories when there were 
fewer sheep and less bracken on the hill. The Pontbren group had the shared 
aim to develop more sustainable farming systems which would allow them and 
their successors to continue traditional family farming in the long term. 
Social capital: The development of social capital in the groups was an important 
factor contributing to effective social learning and successful co-operative 
working in both of the case studies. The social capital manifested itself in a 
number of ways, including an increase in trust. A certain degree of trust already 
existed between Pontbren members due to existing informal social networks and 
kinship bonds. However, social capital on these farms had become eroded since 
the 1960s as production-orientated subsidies and intensification made farmers 
more independent and individualistic, with less time to socialise which has 
contributed to social isolation.  Likewise, on Ireland Moor, there was some 
contact between graziers before the ESA agreement and an association was in 
place but other than agreeing dates to place stock onto the commons there was 
minimal contact between the graziers.  Members of both groups particularly 
valued the increased social interaction and the “feeling of belonging” brought 
about by group membership. 
“It’s nice because you belong all of a sudden to something.  It didn’t happen before 
although we’ve obviously been neighbours all our life, but not as close“. (Pontbren 
member). 
 
“The group has a feeling of solidarity, even as a new comer I feel involved and 
working towards a common purpose” (Ireland Moor member). 
With both groups there was also an increased willingness to learn from each 
other and a greater embeddedness of reciprocal advice and support mechanisms 
based on trust and respect.   
“The one thing I like more than anything is the companionship and the closeness 
and to be able to rely on people.  You know that if you ring them you can rely on 
them and that they can rely on you......And respect as well, you have to respect 
each other as well because there is a lot of give and take”.  (Pontbren member) 
Social network analysis revealed that the Pontbren group derived much support 
from their group but had sparser networks around their businesses.  Due to the 
large size (100) of the Ireland Moor it was not as closely knit or ‘dense’, but had a 
number of sub-groups that were close to one another.  In such a situation key 
brokers existed between the sub-groups, bringing groups together and helping 
the flow of information. 
Homogeneity of identities and interests: With both case studies, members were 
already known to each other, or part of some existing local informal social 
network, which predisposed them to work together and to learn from each other.   
Social network analysis of the two groups found that the average length of time 
other group members were known to one another was over 30 years.  Thus, 
group members might be described as ‘kith’ in the archaic sense that they are 
associates from the same place, rather than people joining together just for 
business or a particular project.  A shared history in these cases therefore 
appears to have facilitated collective action by promoting trust and reflecting 
common interests.   
 Appropriate leadership:  For both case studies, success was in part due to 
competent and imaginative leadership.  As Hodge and Reader (2007) assert, 
successful co-operative working relies on the action taken by  individual ‘social 
entrepreneurs’ who are willing and able to stimulate action in their local areas.  If 
such leadership is not present in these situations, collective action may not occur 
even though every individual would actually like to co-operate with the others.  
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The Pontbren leader with support from other members helped to mobilise 
neighbours to join the group and on Ireland Moor, one member was key to getting 
other common graziers involved.   
 
3.3 Institutional arrangements 
The research findings suggest that whilst social learning can lead to collective 
action it depends in turn upon particular facilitation and institutional arrangements 
that can facilitate social learning and collective action.  Of particular importance 
appear to be: group size; the degree of group autonomy enabling farmers to 
develop their own solutions and devise their own rules; and the degree of self-
monitoring. 
Group size:  The Pontbren group started with a small group of three farmers, 
which grew over time once the benefits of their actions became evident to other 
farmers.  The current group size of ten was determined by the members as to 
what was manageable, enabling effective communication and monitoring.  The 
Pontbren members stressed the importance of keeping group size small, as this 
facilitated the maintenance and development of good personal connections and 
social learning between different members.  They felt that a large group would 
increase the time needed to establish and maintain connections.  The smaller 
groups also facilitated the ease of monitoring, as individuals’ behaviours were 
more visible.   
This does not preclude larger groups from collective action.  All 100 commoners 
are members of the Ireland Moor group.  However, to ensure effective 
communication and social learning, the main interaction occurs between a central 
committee of ten members who meet regularly and deal with the business of the 
group, including the distribution of the AES payment.  Each member of the 
committee has a group of members within their locality to whom they are 
responsible for consulting and communicating dates of meetings, group decisions 
and so on.  This was seen as very effective, by all those interviewed.   
“We get feedback now; we know what is going on.  You need a small committee to 
make it work.” (Ireland Moor member) 
Degree of group autonomy:  The case studies highlighted the value that farmers 
placed in being involved in the process of problem framing and resolution.  
Allowing farmers to find their own solutions through a process of social learning 
resulted in stronger group ownership.  The Pontbren members obtained a source 
of funding which allowed them to decide on the rules and standards for work 
when implementing the hedge and tree planting scheme.  The members greatly 
appreciated this autonomy. 
  “We were our own bosses.  This is what we liked about it, being our own boss.  
There is nothing worse than being told by someone else how to do something and 
you half know that they’ve failed themselves.  That really does get to you.  With 
Pontbren no one interfered with us.  We chose what we wanted to do, but there 
was a standard” (Pontbren member). 
The Ireland Moor commoners determined the content of the legal agreement to 
supplement the AES agreement themselves and this included provision for 
sanctions, should any member not abide by the AES agreement.    
Self–monitoring:  Within all case studies there was an element of self-monitoring.  
Certain members of the Pontbren group were appointed inspectors to check the 
quality of the work. This was evidently an effective way of monitoring, as 
reputation effects ensured compliance and a high standard of work. 
“The members wouldn’t even think about doing something underhand or shoddy 
or not up to standard, because they are not only letting themselves but they are 
letting the group down and this is a big thing” (Pontbren member). 
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Also within the Ireland Moor group any compliance issues were investigated by 
the management group which had thus far resolved any issues internally, 
including the passing of sanctions on a member who broke the AES agreement.  
This resulted in a withdrawal of his payment for a certain period.  
 
3.4 External Influence 
All three case studies had external facilitators who were important in supporting 
farmers to gain access to information and knowledge.  These facilitators, to 
varying degrees in each situation, also played an important role in assisting with 
the social learning process and group development which often required 
substantial amounts of time and resources.  Rather than prescribing changes 
these facilitators assisted in developing skills required for working together, such 
as communication, conflict resolution and group decision-making.  Importantly, 
the facilitators avoided “spoon-feeding” the groups, allowing them to gain in 
strength by resolving their own issues.   
The case studies also suggested that not all agencies’ staff will make appropriate 
facilitators, even if they have received appropriate training.  The best facilitators, 
in the opinion of group members, were those people who were local, respected 
by farmers and able to enter into dialogue with them.  Effective facilitation 
requires defined skills and these facilitators also had the necessary personality 
and training to undertake their tasks.   
 
4. Implications for AES design and delivery 
The research reported here has enabled us to suggest ‘key success factors’ that 
can lead to collective action for environmental outcomes.  This can assist policy 
makers by informing the design and delivery of appropriate AES for land 
management at a landscape scale.   
 
Table 2 Key success factors in developing co-operative AES 
 
Engagement Institutional arrangements • Adapt engagement strategies to local 
features and resources  • Provide group training and learning 
opportunities • Support group product marketing, if 
relevant 
• Limit group size  • Allow groups to develop own solutions 
and implementation rules  • Offer single payment to properly 
constituted group to distribute 
Group characteristics External influence • Members with common aims and 
objectives • Members known to each other  • Strong leadership 
• Support local facilitator to assist in group 
development process  • Offer financial support in 2 stages 
(planning and management)  
 
4.1 Adapt engagement strategies to local features and resources  
The research revealed that the motivation for participating in a collective scheme 
may be broader than those for individual schemes.  As motivations will differ 
depending on local situations, a ‘one size fits all’ approach to engaging farmers in 
a collective scheme should be avoided.  For instance, a model of engagement 
that might work on common land in the uplands might not succeed on productive 
lowland areas.  In attempting to engage farmers in collective action it may be 
beneficial to identify local features or resources of value that are unique and 
threatened and which might be protected through their actions.  Examples might 
include the protection of particular local breeds or water resources within a water 
catchment area.  
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The research found that farmers also value opportunities for group learning and 
training.  Economies of scale can arise from the provision of advice to groups of 
farmers, meaning that the advice can go much further and be of more benefit 
than if support is delivered to the individual.   
4.2 Group characteristics 
The research suggests that for collaborative activities to work within AES, it is 
important to ascertain that all members of the group share common objectives 
and interests in relation to the environment.  Because farmers have worked 
together co-operatively for commercial or business reasons may not necessarily 
mean that they have a common interest in achieving environmental outcomes.  
However, it does help if members are already known to each other, or part of 
some existing local informal social network, as this predisposes them to learn 
from each other and work together. 
4.3 Institutional arrangements 
A key finding from the research is that these groups should ideally start small 
reaching a size that still enables effective communication, social learning and 
development in the initial stages.  Whilst it is possible for larger groups to 
succeed, they require a small central core of members who meet regularly to 
enable effective communication and decision-making. 
Within existing individual AES there is limited scope for agreement holder 
participation in the preparation of agreements.  The research revealed that farmer 
groups value schemes which have enough flexibility to allow ideas to come from 
the farmers on how the group scheme is implemented.   For this to work, external 
agencies may need to inform farmers of the issues and through an iterative 
process of social learning collectively develop solutions with them. Such an 
approach to problem-solving is likely to be lengthy but may also be more likely to 
succeed where farmers develop a sense of both personal relevance and self-
efficacy (Dwyer et al., 2007).  Having identified solutions, the schemes should 
also enable groups to develop their own rules to meet the scheme objectives, as 
the research revealed that group members place a high value on retaining farm 
autonomy.  Whilst this participatory approach is beneficial it is recognised that in 
the UK context the complex funding and accountancy structures of co-financed 
EU AES means that the ultimate decision-making power must rest with the 
government (Prager and Nagel, 2008).  Thus, participatory approaches can only 
supplement, not replace government administrative decision-making processes.  
Also, for this approach to work there must be a certain level of trust between the 
famers and Government agencies (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Franks and 
McGloin, 2007). 
Within collective schemes a single payment should, ideally, be offered to properly 
constituted formal groups, who are then responsible for dividing it up between 
members in a way that is clear, accountable and formalised.  The case studies 
found that this approach can often lead to an equitable distribution of payments, 
sometimes benefitting smaller farmers.  Such an approach has the advantage of 
reducing the amount of agency time spent on individual negotiations and leaves 
the responsibility for resolving any disputes between members with the group 
itself.  However, the group may require external guidance in establishing a legal 
framework for allocating payments and resolving any disputes. 
4.4 External influence 
Individual agreement holders in AES have the support of a project officer, who 
provides advice and can offer some flexibility in scheme prescriptions in the form 
of derogations.  The group scheme could also provide the support of a facilitator 
to assist in the social learning and group development processes.  In order to 
take on collective responsibility for land management, both case study groups 
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needed help in establishing a formalised structure and required legal assistance 
in establishing an appropriate constitution.  The groups also needed to determine 
liability in the event of non-compliance with management prescriptions, in the 
event that they become formal collective participants in a public-funded land 
management scheme. It would be a large cost to bear early on for scheme 
beneficiaries, if they paid for a facilitator.  Thus funds could be made available for 
this initial capacity building process, even if the outputs are not immediately 
tangible.   
Adequate payments will be required to ensure engagement and should at least 
cover the cost of management activities associated with running and belonging to 
a group.  The transaction costs will initially be higher for group schemes 
compared to individual agreements (Falconer, 2000) and these are borne by both 
the government agency, in respect of facilitation, and by the group in respect of 
the time taken in finalising the agreement and possible legal fees in developing 
the co-operative.  However, there may be cost savings later in the schemes with 
less government administration, due to significantly fewer individual agreement 
negotiations. 
The group will need to have a clear idea about timescale for action. The research 
findings suggest that any successful group will take time to establish, to develop 
into maturity and then to deliver real change in land management.  Ideally, a 
period of ten years would be advisable over which to seek a significant impact 
upon farming practices.  The research suggests that a useful approach would be 
to offer seedcorn support for an initial planning stage (1 year) after which they 
can apply for a full formal agreement using some form of independent legal 
status in order to release the AES management funding.  This implies two 
specific sorts of group funding – a phase one startup package and then a longer 
term AES management package, which would be based around the level of 
funding available to individual farmer AES agreements, but offered with more 
flexibility and autonomy in return for a group scheme contract and including some 
money to cover ongoing co-ordination, management and group activity.  There 
may also be a requirement for some kind of group milestones to be reached in 
order to release grant aid. This diminishes the risk of funding social meetings with 
no outcome and no obvious end point.  Eventually, as the group develops there 
may be fewer transaction costs involved in monitoring and advice provision. 
The research also showed that ultimately, investment in co-operative agri-
environment schemes can lead to more confident farmers with a greater cultural 
embeddedness of environmental practices.  With both case studies, through a 
process of social learning, group members changed their attitudes towards the 
prevailing farming practices and sought ways of changing to more sustainable 
farming systems.   Through this process they gained in confidence and were able 
to establish the necessary legal entities required to obtain AES funding. Business 
and social confidence grew within both groups which opened up further 
development opportunities.  For example, the Pontbren group are currently 
exploring opportunities for the joint marketing of a branded product to a 
supermarket.  
4.5 Concluding remarks 
To conclude, co-operative AES could not only deliver biodiversity benefits at a 
landscape-scale, but could also be used as a catalyst for further social and rural 
development benefits.  Improving the farming community’s capacity for social 
learning and to co-operate will have far-reaching benefits for all public good 
provision and diversification activities.  To be effective this will require some 
decentralization of the decision-making from Government agencies, allowing 
greater discretion to scheme participants to determine the way in which 
requirements are defined and payment rates are determined.  This would to 
some extent require a cultural change within government agencies and an 
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increase in the level of trust between government agencies and farmers and vice 
versa.       
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